Policy Making and Speculative Attacks in Models of Exchange Rate Crises: A Synthesis by Corsetti, Giancarlo & Cavallari, Lilia
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
2-1-1996 
Policy Making and Speculative Attacks in Models of Exchange 
Rate Crises: A Synthesis 
Giancarlo Corsetti 
Lilia Cavallari 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Corsetti, Giancarlo and Cavallari, Lilia, "Policy Making and Speculative Attacks in Models of Exchange 
Rate Crises: A Synthesis" (1996). Discussion Papers. 760. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/760 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
P.O. Box 208269 
27 Hillhouse Avenue 
New Haven, CT 06520-8269 
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 752 
POLICY MAKING AND SPECULATIVE ATTACKS IN 
MODELS OF EXCHANGE RATE CRISES: 
A SYNTHESIS 
Giancarlo Corsetti 
University of Rome III 
Lilia Cavallari 
University of Rome "La Sapienza" 
February 1996 
Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussions and critical comments. This paper was originally written June 
1995. Professor Corsetti was a Visiting Lecturer in the Economics Department 
at Yale University. 
1 
Policy Making and Speculative Attacks in 
Models of Exchange Rate Crises: A Synthesis* 
Lilia Cavallari 
University of Rome "La Sapienza" 
Giancarlo Corsetti 
University of Rome III 
February 1996 
Abstract 
This paper discusses within a common analytical framework the 
logical and analytical links between theories of exchange rate crises 
that model the abandonment of a peg as an optimizing decision by ra­
tional policy makers, and theories that focus on the dynamics of spec­
ulative attacks when policies are incoherent with the indefinite defense 
of the current nominal parity. We show that, in both cases, the con­
dition for a crisis to occur can be expressed by a simple arbitrage rule 
on exchange rates. We analyze the different economic mechanisms 
underlying the common arbitrage rule. We also discuss a common 
mechanism raising the possibility of multiple instantaneous equilibria 
and self-fulfilling speculative attacks. 
KEY WORDS: Speculative Attacks, Exchange Rate Crises 
Two styles of modelling currency crises 
This paper reconsiders the literature on exchange rate crises by contrasting 
two main approaches to modelling a currency collapse. According to the 
first approach, the crisis is triggered by the behavior of private agents: the 
*Correspondence to: Giancarlo Corsetti, Dip. Economia, Universita' degli Studi Roma 
Tre, Via Ostiense 139, 00145 Roma, Italy. E-mail: corsetti @ elektra.econ.yale.edu. 
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analysis is focused on the dynamics and timing of speculative attacks in the 
foreign exchange markets. According to the alternative approach, abandon­
ing the defense of an exchange rate parity (or target zone) is ultimately a 
policy decision. The analysis is therefore focused on policy makers' prefer­
ences and behavior. Differently from other contributions (see Obstfeld [1994] 
and Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996] among others), we contrast these 
two modelling styles within a common analytical framework. Starting from 
the specification of a small open economy, we presents two analyses of an 
exchange rate crisis, each representing one modelling style, and contrast the 
arbitrage mechanism that triggers the crisis. 
The first approach, pioneered by Krugman [1979], takes speculative at­
tacks as the proximate cause of an exchange rate crisis. Speculative attacks 
are the optimal market reaction to policies that are inconsistent with the in­
definite survival of a fixed nominal parity. The simplest version of the model 
assumes a lower bound on international reserves beyond which the parity 
is no longer defended, while domestic credit expansion persistently exceeds 
the growth of money demand. Under both these assumptions, the exchange 
rate regime must eventually collapse, even in the absence of a speculative 
attack: for a given money demand in a credible peg, international reserves 
shrinks at the same rate of domestic credit expansion, and reach their lower 
bound in finite time. The event of an exchange rate crisis without a specu­
lative attack, defined "natural collapse" by Grilli [1986], is associated with 
jumps in both the interest and the exchange rates. In competitive markets, 
however, rational expectations rule out the possibility of anticipated jumps 
in prices providing clear arbitrage opportunities. The actual collapse of the 
parity must therefore occur before the natural collapse. In each period, pri­
vate agents can attack the currency, drive reserves to their lower bound and 
force the policy maker to abandon the exchange rate target. An exchange 
rate crisis will thus occur as soon as a speculative attack on the currency 
yields non-negative profits. 
The exact timing of the crisis of a fixed exchange rate regime may nonethe­
less be indeterminate. A seminal paper by Obstfeld (Obstfeld [1986]) makes 
this point by assuming that the rate of domestic credit expansion becomes 
inconsistent with the defense of the nominal parity only conditional on the 
realization of a speculative attack. For the same fundamentals of the econ­
omy (say, for the same level of wages and the same realization of exogenous 
shocks to productivity and velocity), it is possible to have two instantaneous 
equilibria: one is characterized by a run on foreign exchange reserves, that 
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triggers a policy switch and therefore leads to the collapse of the exchange 
rate regime; in the other equilibrium, no attack occurs and the current parity 
is maintained. As a result, the timing of the attack depends on the coordina­
tion of the private sector expectations on a particular regime. In this paper, 
we offer a different characterization of multiple instantaneous equilibria in 
a Krugman-style model, that stresses the conceptual and analytical analogy 
with the second approach. 
The second approach is championed by Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti 
[1995, 1996], De Kock and Grilli [1993), Drazen and Masson [1993], Flood, 
Bhandari and Horne [1989), Obstfeld [1991, 1994] and Ozkan and Sutherland 
[1994] among others. As in Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996), we will re­
fer to it as the "endogenous policy approach" to modelling currency crises. 
The analysis focuses on rational policy makers who use the exchange rate as 
an optimization instrument. The peg of the exchange rate can be used, for 
example, as a means to gain anti-inflationary credibility. The policy maker 
decides whether to defend or to abandon the current parity weighting social 
costs and benefits of each regime. 
As the commitment to defend the nominal parity is only imperfectly 
credible, the expectations game between the private sector and the policy 
maker may generate multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, the private sector 
develops expectations of exchange rate stability, reducing nominal wages and 
interest rates. This lowers the benefits from a devaluation and strengthen 
the policy-maker ability to defend the exchange rate parity. In a second 
equilibrium, agents assign a high probability to a realignment, driving up 
wages and interest rates and making the regime more vulnerable to domestic 
and foreign shocks. Thus, the timing of the crisis is indeterminate, insofar 
as the stability of the exchange rate may be affected by a sudden shift in the 
regime of expectations. 
This paper aims to explore the logical and analytical links between the 
Krugman's approach and the endogenous policy approach. Section 2 presents 
a model of a small open economy. Within this common specification of the 
economy, we will describe the mechanics of speculative attacks leading to 
the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime in Section 3, and analyze ratio­
nal policy making resulting in an exchange rate crisis in Section 4. In each 
section, we will begin with a characterization of monetary policy; we will 
then move to the analysis of the arbitrage condition underlying the crisis; we 
will analyze the mechanics of the crisis; finally we will explore the possibil­
ity of multiple instantaneous equilibria and discuss the role of self-fulfilling 
3 
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speculative attacks. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
A common analytical framework 
2 .1 The structure of the economy 
This section describes the structure of a small open economy that includes an 
aggregate supply function and a monetary sector. Unless otherwise specified, 
all variables ( except interest rates) are expressed in logarithms. The real 
sector is as in Obstfeld [1994]. The aggregate supply is a function of the real 
wage and of a productivity shock: 
Yt = a (pt - Wt) - Ut 
where Pt is the price level, Wt the nominal wage and Ut a productivity dis­
turbance that is identically and independently distributed with a zero mean. 
The model is characterized by nominal wage rigidity: all wage contracts are 
signed at the beginning of each period, and are valid for one period only. 
Workers' objective function is quadratic in the deviation of income from its 
equilibrium value (Yt = 0). With rational expectations, the optimal wage is 
thus equal to the expected price level1: 
(2) 
where Et-1 is the expectation operator conditional on information available 
in period t - l. 
Money demand is a function of income, nominal interest rate, it and of a 
velocity shock, At : 
(3) 
Money supply differs in the two approaches to currency crises under consid­
eration. It will be specified in Sections 3 and 4 below. 
We assume both uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
1The workers' objective function is 
The expression in the text derives from the first order condition EtYt = 0. 
it = i; + Et[et+1] - et (4) 
and purchasing power parity (PPP) 
(5) 
where the foreign nominal interest rate ii is stationary and the foreign price 
level is constant and equal to one, so that the nominal exchange rate coincides 
with the domestic price level. 
2.2 The semi-reduced form 
Substituting the aggregate supply (1), the demand for money (3) and the 
PPP condition (5) in the uncovered interest parity condition (4), we can de­
scribe the dynamics of the exchange rate in terms of the following differential 
equation: 
Solving this differential equation forward under the appropriate transversality 
condition, the equilibrium exchange rate can be expressed as a function of 
four variables: the current wage level Wt, that is predetermined during the 
period; a linear combination of the current and the expected future money 
supply; a contemporaneous productivity shock, 'Uti and an index of nominal 
shocks Et, that includes exogenous uncertainty regarding velocity and the 
foreign interest rate 
where the index of nominal shocks €tis a forward-looking variable: 
Note that the expression (7) incorporates the equilibrium condition in the 
labor market (2): with one-period contracts, the difference between expected 
future wages and exchange rates is zero. The equilibrium exchange rate in 
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semi-reduced form (7) together with the labor market equilibrium condition 
(2) will be our main analytical tools in Sections 2 and 3 below. In these sec­
tions, we will analyze a currency crisis following the two alternative modelling 
styles. As the specification of monetary policy is very different in the two 
models, we will begin our discussion from a description of monetary policy 
in relation to the policy makers' macroeconomic goals. 
3 Krugman-style models of exchange rate crises 
Krugman-style models of exchange rate crises focus on the optimizing behav­
ior of private markets during a crisis. The public sector behavior is generally 
reduced to a policy function that is informally related to (rather than formally 
derived from) specific policy objectives. Spotlights are on private agents, that 
determine a crisis arbitrating profits across exchange rate regimes. 
3.1 A policy function 
The basic ingredients of Krugman [1979] analysis are well known. The first 
one is an exogenously given process driving domestic credit, such as 
(8) 
where dt is domestic credit and {t is white noise. Informally, the process of 
domestic credit expansion (8) is sometimes related to the need for seigniorage 
that arises in the presence of persistent budget deficits. The second basic 
ingredient is a lower limit to the stock of international reserves, below which 
the monetary authorities stop defending the exchange rate parity et. Some 
contributions in the literature have related this limit to public sector solvency 
assuming a high opportunity cost of borrowing reserves (for a discussion see 
Buiter [1987]). For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the lower threshold 
on reserves to zero 
(9) 
where Rt is the level of reserves. Note that combining the two assumptions 
(8) and (9) is equivalent to imposing a lower bound on money supply: 
1nt ~ In(Dt + R) (10) 
where Dt denotes the level of domestic credit. Expressions (8) and (9) char­
acterize our policy function. 
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3.2 Speculative attacks and arbitrage in the foreign 
exchange market 
Using a Krugman-style specification, the analyst is interested in modelling 
markets' behavior around a crisis. Rational agents know that, given the 
policy function defined by (8) and (9), no fixed parity et can be sustained 
indefinitely. This point can be illustrated by means of a simple argument. 
Suppose that markets consider the parity et perfectly credible so that the 
wage level coincides with the exchange rate parity. Then, money demand is 
stationary, depending only on exogenous shocks 
(11) 
Against a stationary money demand, domestic credit is trended. Over time, 
the process of domestic credit expansion tends to drive international reserves 
towards their lower limit. As a result, the current parity is bound to be 
abandoned in finite time with probability one. The question is then: should 
rational agents wait for such a "natural collapse" of the exchange rate regime, 
or act before that? 
Private agents can, in each period, attack the currency, drive interna­
tional reserves to the lower limit and cause the abandonment of the peg. A 
speculative attack will be (weakly) profitable if and only if the exchange rate 
does not appreciate as a consequence of the attack, that is 
(12) 
where At is aggregate net profit from a speculative attack. Loosely speaking, 
informed agents will not attack the currency "too early", that is, before the 
domestic credit expansion has gone far enough to result in an exchange rate 
depreciation when the current parity is abandoned. A rational decision thus 
requires agents to compute the post-attack level of the exchange rate. 
The key feature of the model that allows agents to pick up the right time 
for an attack is the stability of the monetary policy regime described by (8) 
and (9). After a speculative attack has driven international reserves to their 
lower limit, the policy maker gives up the exchange rate target. From then 
on, the level of money supply is exogenously determined and coincides with 
domestic credit 
mts = ln(Dt+s + R) = dt+s (13) 
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where a superscript R means "conditional on the abandonment of the peg". 
Therefore, the current and expected future money supply after a speculative 






Et~ l + 8 m~B = 1 + 8 - r,odt 
The exchange rate conditional on a speculative attack, denoted by et will be 
given by the semi-reduced form (7) evaluated using (14) 
(15) 
Note that the above expression is valid for any wage rate, including the 
equilibrium one, to be discussed in the next section. Flood and Garber 
[1984] define et as the shadow exchange rote. The condition for an exchange 
rate crisis to occur can be re-defined in terms of the shadow exchange rate 
(16) 
where, for future reference, we define .D.et as the shadow depreciation rate 
{SDR). In each period, the exchange rate parity will be maintained if the 
SDR is negative, abandoned otherwise 
if ..6.et < o (17) 
The shadow exchange rate is a linear function of both real and nominal 
shocks, Ut and f.t. Figure 1 plots the :fixed parity and the shadow exchange 
rate against the support of the combined shock Vt = <frut +f.t, for given wages. 
Figure 1 here 
The actual exchange rate will coincide with the parity to the left of the 
threshold value Vt, where the SDR is below et. It coincides with the shadow 
exchange rate to the right of Vt• 
The basic mechanism underlying Krugman's analysis is private arbitrage. 
Profit-maximizing agents arbitrate profits across the two exchange rate regimes. 
It is important to stress that there is no corresponding switch in the mon­
etary policy regime. On the contrary, it is the stability of the policy rule 
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defined by (8) and (9) that gives speculators the option to force a crisis by 
launching a speculative attack before the point of a "natural collapse". In 
equilibrium, the payoff of an optimal exercise of such an option is 
Note that ·Figure 1 can also be reinterpreted in terms of such a payoff per 
unit of international reserve money. 
As well known, Krugman's original specification does not allow for un­
certainty. The basic mechanism of an exchange rate crisis following a spec­
ulative attack is a deterministic one. Including uncertainty in the model is 
nonetheless a meaningful exercise, insofar as it accounts for positive interest 
differentials emerging with expectations of a devaluation. Note also that, in 
our framework, output is not fixed, but depends on the exchange rate policy. 
A crisis raises output and employment, with a positive effect on the demand 
for real balances. During the crisis, the sharp contraction in the demand 
for money that determines the speculative attack on reserves is exclusively 
driven by the increase in the interest rate anticipating a future depreciation. 
3.3 Multiple instantaneous equilibria 
The case for multiple equilibria in a Krugman-style model of exchange rate 
crisis is first presented by Obstfeld [1986], who modifies the assumption of a 
stable monetary policy regime. The domestic credit component of the policy 
function (8) becomes conditional on the occurrence of a speculative attack 
dt+1 - 1Jdt +et if speculative attack (18) 
dt+1 - d otherwise 
The stability of the exchange rate then depends on what the private sector 
does2• For a given level of wages, over some range of the support of the 
exogenous shocks Vt two instantaneous equilibria are possible: if agents at­
tack the currency, the policy maker switches monetary regime and the fixed 
exchange rate regime collapses; if there is no speculative attack, the policy 
maker maintains a behavior consistent with the survival of the peg. Such a 
2 0bstfeld [1986] carefully restricts the parameters as to rule out the possibility of a 
natural collapse in the absense of a speculative attack. 
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specification runs into the problem of defining what determines the coordina­
tion of private agents on one of the two possible equilibria. The coordination 
mechanism is usually assumed to be driven by exogenous uncertainty. 
It is worth stressing that, in our specification, there is an additional chan­
nel through which multiple instantaneous equilibria may emerge, different 
from the one proposed by Obstfeld [1986]. This channel is the expectations 
game between the private and the public sectors underlying the determina­
tion of nominal wages, to be further discussed at the end of Section 4. 
Consider again the process of domestic credit expansion (8) and focus on 
the determination of nominal wages given by expression (2). By writing out 
this expression, the nominal wage will be equal to the current parity plus the 
expected depreciation rate 
(19) 
where 'lrt is the probability of a devaluation in period t. By (16), 7rt coincides 
with the probability that the shadow depreciation rate be positive 
What raises the possibility of multiple equilibria is the fact that the shadow 
depreciation rate is itself a function of nominal wages. It turns out that, 
for a large class of distribution of shocks, the equilibrium nominal wage may 
· not be unique. In appendix I we solve for the rational expectations level of 
nominal wage, and present a simple example where multiple equilibria may 
arise with a uniform distribution of the shock Vt. 
In the presence of multiplicity of equilibria, anticipations of exchange rate 
instability leads to high nominal wages, that reduce output and determine 
a drop in money demand. For a given level of domestic credit, the drop 
· in money demand translates into a contraction of the stock of international 
reserves. This is the channel through which high nominal wages increase the 
probability of a devaluation in a self-fulfilling way. Conversely, low nominal 
wages are associated with a higher output, that raises money demand. The 
rate of depletion of international reserves is slowed down. As a result, low 
wages decrease the probability of a devaluation, making the current parity 
less vulnerable to nominal and real shocks. The stability of the exchange rate 
parity during the current period depends on which equilibrium wage setters 
coordinate their expectations when contracts are signed. 
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4 The "endogenous policy approach" 
A different approach to exchange rate crises stresses the fact that abandoning 
a fixed exchange rate regime is ultimately a policy choice. Policy makers 
are now the main actors on stage: in the analysis, private agents arbitrating 
profits are replaced by policy makers arbitrating social utility across exchange 
rate regimes. In order to highlight analogies and differences with the previous 
approach, we will use the same layout of the model as in section 3. Our 
analysis thus begins with the description of monetary policy in relation to 
the policy makers' objective function. 
4.1 Policy preferences 
In the context of the endogenous policy approach, a policy function is derived 
from "first principles" rather than posited by assumption. In our specifica­
tion, a policy maker lacking anti-inflationary credibility uses the exchange 
rate as an imperfect commitment device. At the beginning of each period, 
before wage contracts are signed, she commits to pursue a unilateral peg. 
Such a commitment is credible only to the extent that the incentive to re­
nege on it after wage contracts are signed is offset by some cost of abandoning 
the peg. Her objective function thus includes two components. The first one 
is the usual quadratic loss function that expresses the inflation-employment 
trade-off. The second component of the objective function is a lump-sum 
welfare cost, paid by the policy maker in the event of a devaluation. 
The policy maker minimizes the following loss function: 
Lt = I:
00 




Et/38 { 0 (pt+s - Pt+s-1)
2 + (Yt+s - y*)2 + Ct+sZt+s} 
s=O 
where /3 is the discount factor, ft is the one-period loss function, y* is the 
target level of output, greater than the market equilibrium level (Yt=O), 0 
measures the aversion towards inflation, Ct is the lump sum welfare cost of 
reneging on the exchange rate commitment, and Zt is a dummy variable 
assuming the value of one in case of realignment and zero otherwise: 
(21) 
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Zt = l if et =I= et 
In the tradition of Kydland and Prescott [1977) and Barro and Gordon [1983), 
the policy maker's preference for a target output greater than the equilibrium 
one3 induces an inflationary bias in policy making. With rational expecta­
tions, private agents are aware of the ex-post incentive for the policy maker 
to resort to a surprise inflation-devaluation. Expected inflation can be con­
tained only if such an incentive is reduced or eliminated altogether. In our 
specification, the fixed exchange rate is at least imperfectly credible because 
abandoning the peg entails welfare costs. We adopt the simplifying assump­
tion of treating this cost as a political cost associated to a devaluation, ex­
ogenously given, reflecting the loss of prestige due to a surprise devaluation. 
Consistently, we assume that the private sector does not behave strategically 
over time and current expectations are independent of past policy choices. 
Alternatively, the realignment costs could be endogenously modelled as rep­
utation costs, emerging from the repeated game between the private and the 
public sector.4 
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each period, 
the policy maker announces that she will defend the current level of the 
exchange rate et = et-I• Given such an announcement, workers sign wage 
contracts prior to the realization of current shocks - so that prices are ex­
ante flexible -. During the period, given nominal wages, the public sector 
optimally chooses its monetary policy contingent on the realization of the 
shocks. 
3The preference for a level of output larger than the equilibrium one is generally mo­
tivated by referring to the existence of distortions that make the market equilibrium 
suboptimal. 
4In a more general specification of our model, the variable Ct can be reinterpreted 
as a synthetic indicator of all intertemporal implications of a surprise abandonement of 
the exchange rate. In this case, the dummy variable Zt would express the intertemporal 
strategies of the private sector in a repeated game with the public sector. For example, we 
may assume that, when the policy maker reneges on her commitments, the private sector 
will not believe her announcement for S periods. During this time span, a unilateral peg 
would completely loose credibility: Zt+s = 1, for s=l,2,... ,S. The only possible equilibrium 
would be one with floating exchange rates and a discretionary monetary policy. In our 
paper, we rule out the possibility that private agents coordinate their expectations over 
time. Thus, Zt has no memory of the past. Using Obstfeld's [1994] terminology, agents 
form memoryless expectations. 
12 
4.2 Realignments and social welfare arbitrage 
In each period, the policy maker can choose between defending and aban­
doning the exchange rate parity. If she chooses to defend the current parity, 
money supply must accommodate all monetary and real shocks hitting the 
economy at the time. Money supply conditional on defending the peg, de­
noted by mF, will be as follows: 
If the policy maker chooses to abandon the exchange rate target, it is rational 
to pursue a discretionary optimal monetary policy. In general, a multi-period 
loss function such as (20) makes the identification of an optimal policy rather 
complicated, because current actions may affect the future state of the econ­
omy. This is not the case in our analysis: the model has no proper state 
variables, wage contracts last only one period and private sector expecta­
tions do not depend on past behavior of the policy makers .. Because of these 
features of the model, monetary policy only affects the current state of the 
economy, and the optimal policy can be identified by minimizing the current 
period loss function ft. The optimal supply of money conditional on aban­
doning the nominal parity, mR, is determined by the first order condition: 
(23) 
Consistently with our analysis of the Krugman's approach, we define the 
shadow depreciation rate ~et as the devaluation rate that follows the aban­
donment of the peg. In the present context, the SDR corresponds to the 
monetary policy implicitly determined by the condition (23). 
The policy maker will rationally choose between the two possible mone­
tary policy regimes ( mF and mR) comparing their relative costs and benefits 
in terms of the loss function (20). The exchange rate parity will be given up 
if and only if social welfare in a flexible exchange rate regime (-ff) exceeds 
social welfare in a fixed exchange rate regime ( -ff) at least by the fixed cost 
Ct: 
devalue iff (24) 
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Note that, since mR is the money supply that minimizes the one period loss 
function, by construction the left hand side of the above inequality cannot 
be negative (i.e. .er - .er 2:'.: 0). Without a positive realignment cost Ct, the 
policy maker's commitment to a fixed exchange rate would never be credible. 
The condition (24) is the analog of the private arbitrage condition (12) in 
section 3. There are two differences. First, the main actor is not the market, 
but the policy-maker, who has the option of switching between monetary pol­
icy regimes: what is maximized is social welfare, rather than private profits. 
Second, there are fixed costs in exercising the regime switch, that are absent 
in Section 3.5 Notwithstanding these differences, both conditions ((24) and 
(12)) can be expressed in terms of the shadow depreciation rate only. 
To begin with, note that the shadow depreciation rate is a function of 
wages, real shocks and policy targets. By using (23), we have 
(25) 
It is instructive to interpret the difference between output in a peg and target 
output (yf - y*) as a measure of the deflationary gap due to the defense of 
the current nommal parity. The above expression makes us aware that there 
is a linear relationship between the SDR and the deflationary gap associated 
with the defense of the peg. Because of this property of the model, we can 
eliminate output from the social arbitrage condition (24), as to obtain 
devalue iff (26) 
The policy maker will optimally switch from defending the peg to pursuing 
a discretionary monetary policy when the shadow depreciation rate (in ab­
solute value) exceeds a critical threshold cf. The value of such a threshold is 
positively related to the welfare cost of abandoning the peg Ct- Clearly, there 
is a formal equivalence between the above expression and the devaluation 
condition in the Krugman-style model of Section 3 (16). The analogy is best 
understood by considering that expression (26) translates the welfare costs 
and benefits of a devaluation into the metric of the exchange rate. This is 
the same metric chosen by Flood and Garber in which to cast the Krugman 
5 Of course, we could include transaction costs in the Krugman-style model of specu­
lative attacks. This would delay the crisis up to the point in which the shadow exchange 
rate exceeds the current parity by at least the magnitude of these transaction costs. 
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model6 • Note that, differently from (16), the above condition is consistent 
with both an optimal devaluation and an optimal revaluation following the 
abandonment of the peg. This is due to assuming a quadratic loss function. 
With optimizing policy makers, the exchange rate behavior can be sum­
marized by a scheme that is analogous to (17): 
(28) 
Figure 2 plots the actual and the shadow exchange rate against the support 
of the real shock, given nominal wages. 
Insert figure 2 
In order to facilitate the comparison with Figure 1, in plotting Figure 2 we 
have restricted the support of the shock in such a way that a re-valuation 
will never be optimal. An apparent difference with Figure 1 is due to the 
presence of lump-sum costs of a realignment, that accounts for the "jump" 
in the actual exchange rate.7 A second, more crucial, difference with Figure 
1 is that e't is not conditional on monetary shocks: this variable is plotted 
against the support of the real shock only. As opposed to Krugman's model, 
in the present context there is no constraint on monetary policy. In other 
words, there is neither an exogenously given process driving domestic credit, 
nor a lower bound on international reserves. In pursuing her employment 
and inflation targets, the policy maker will always and fully accommodate 
monetary shocks. 
6We could also express the switching rule in terms of the output gap: 
devalue iff IY[ -y; I~ (27) 
where cf expresses the opportunity cost of defending the exchange rate in terms of per­
centage points of output ( with respect to the target) sacrificed to exchange rate stability. 
7Transaction costs in Krugman-style models would drive a wedge between the shadow 
exchange rate and the defended parity at the threshold value Vt, similar to the one in 
Figure 2. 
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4.3 Multiple instantaneous equilibria and the role of 
speculative attacks 
This section analyzes the expectations game between the private and the 
public sector underlying the determination of wages. Such a game plays a 
more important role here than in the Krugman-style model. In the Krug­
man's model, once monetary authorities have set their policy, private agents 
can "force" the government to devalue by launching a speculative attack on 
the currency that drives reserves to their lower limit. In the endogenous 
policy approach, once wage contracts are signed, there is nothing that the 
private sector can do to "force" a devaluation. In the architecture of the 
model, abandoning the peg is an optimal policy choice. Nonetheless, the pri­
vate sector can affect the policy outcome by changing the conditions based 
on which policy makers decide their conduct. 
In the context of the endogenous policy approach, the optimal policy de­
cision is contingent on the real shocks hitting the economy during the period 
as well as on the level of nominal wages. When multiple instantaneous equi­
libria are possible, over time the policy maker may face different equilibrium 
levels of the wage rate. The stability of the peg is thus affected by switches 
in the market coordination among possible equilibria. This mechanism pro­
vides the theoretical foundations for a theory of self-fulfilling "speculative" 
behavior in the modelling style under consideration. 
In determining the rational expectations level of the wage rate, multiple 
instantaneous equilibria arise for exactly the same reason discussed in section 
3. Re-define the probability of devaluation as: 
(29) 
Then the computation of equilibrium nominal wage combines expectations of 
the exchange rates in the two possible regimes, weighted by the corresponding 
probabilities: 
(30) 
As before, multiple instantaneous equilibria stem from the fact that the 
shadow depreciation rate is itself a function of nominal wages. Details are 
given in the Appendix II. 
With multiple equilibria, the stability of the exchange rate regime depends 
on the equilibrium on which private agents coordinate their expectations. 
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We carry out a simulation of the model using the same parameter values as 
in Obstfeld [1994].8 In the simulation, we obtain two equilibria: a vicious 
equilibrium, characterized by high expected inflation and a high ex ante 
probability of devaluation; and a more stable, virtuous equilibrium, where 
expected inflation and therefore the wage rate are low. 
Figure 3 here 
Figure 3c plots the differential of the loss function ft in the two regimes 
(given by the left hand side of (24)) as well as a particular value of the 
cost Ct against the support of the shock Ut. The loss differential draws a 
non-linear function that crosses the cost line twice, identifying two possible 
equilibrium thresholds iit.9 The lower trigger point is associated with high 
equilibrium wage inflation. At the current parity, this implies a sharp decline 
in competitiveness and stagflation. Abandoning the peg turns out to be 
optimal for a wide range of productivity shocks, including favorable but small 
ones. Figure 3b draws the shadow exchange rate in such an equilibrium. As 
apparent from the graph, the stability of the exchange rate parity is possible 
only for large favorable shocks (on the left side of the plot). Conversely, 
the higher trigger point is associated with moderate inflation expectations. 
The average deflationary gap due to the defense of the peg is small, and 
a devaluation is optimal only for sizeable negative shocks.10 The graph in 
Figure 3a plots the corresponding shadow exchange rate. It is worth stressing 
that expectations are self-fulfilling in both equilibria: 'as the optimal policy is 
conditional on nominal wages, rationally formed expectations are confirmed 
on average by actual policy making. 
Modelling speculative attacks as self-fulfilling prophecies requires a move 
from the identification of multiple instantaneous equilibria to the analysis 
8The graph is drawn for the following parameters values : a = 1, 0 = .15, y• = .01, 
µ=.03. 
9 Clearly, for sufficiently low values of the political cost, there could be no interior 
solution. The threshold level of ut would correspond to the lower bound of the support 
so that the peg would not be credible. We have a unique solution when the cost line is 
tangent to the non linear function. If the support of the shock is bounded to the right, 
a sufficiently high value of the cost can assure perfect credibility to the exchange rate 
regime. 
10A simple exercise of comparative statics shows that an increase in the cost of realign­
ment enhances the credibility of the commitment to a fixed exchange rate, but only in the 
virtuous equilibrium. The opposite is true in the vicious equilibrium. 
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of a dynamic economy in real time. Even when the economy is in the vir­
tuous equilibrium of Figure 3a - the argument goes - one cannot rule out 
that a sudden shift in the regime of expectations will reduce the stability of 
the exchange rate parity one period ahead, by moving the economy to the 
vicious equilibrium of Figure 3b. Unfortunately, the literature has not (yet) 
provided a convincing theory of how expectations coordinate on a particular 
regime over time. As pointed out in Section 3, the coordination mechanism 
is generally modelled by resorting to exogenous uncertainty, that is, by spec­
ifying an ex ante arbitrary probability distribution defined over all possible 
equilibria. 
Insofar as such a shift in coordination increases the probability of a deval­
uation and the equilibrium interest rate, it also causes a contraction in money 
demand at the time when expectations are formed. The shift from the good 
to the bad equilibrium leads to a speculative attack on the currency. Such a 
speculative attack, however, has no direct consequence on the stability of the 
exchange rate. The shadow depreciation rate does not depend on monetary 
shocks, and a shift in the regime of expectations affects policy making only 
through the level of wages. 
Conclusions 
This paper has contrasted two styles of modelling exchange rate crises within 
a common analytical framework. The first style is initiated by Krugman 
[1979], who models speculative attacks as the proximate cause of a currency 
collapse. The focus is on market behavior. According to the second style -
the "endogenous policy approach" - the abandonment of a peg is ultimately 
a policy decision. The focus is on optimal exchange rate policy by rational 
policy makers. Building on our common framework, we have discussed two 
analyses of a currency crisis, each representative of a particular modelling 
style. 
In Section 4, we have shown that, in the model we have taken as represen­
tative of the endogenous policy approach, the defense of the exchange rate 
during the period does not depend on the realization of monetary shocks. 
Provided that maintaining the peg is the optimal strategy for the policy 
maker, money supply will fully accommodate shocks to velocity and foreign 
interest rate. This characteristic of the model can be related to the well 
known result in the literature on the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes 
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first shown by Poole [1970]. 
The model of section 4 does not include any constraint on monetary 
policy, in the form of either lower bounds on foreign reserves or domestic 
credit requirements. This is to stress the point that the abandonment of the 
exchange rate parity is a policy choice, rather than an event due to technical 
reasons (such as the depletion of the stock of international reserves). After 
all, as Obstfeld and Rogoff [1995] put it, the exchange rate is the price of one 
currency in terms of another: the monetary authorities can always defend a 
given exchange rate parity, provided they are willing to reduce the supply 
of the domestic currency to an appropriately low level. Even if domestic 
credit is fixed, it is still possible to defend the peg through repeated sales of 
borrowed international reserves (see Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996] for 
a discussion). 
These considerations are particularly important in the presence of mul­
tiple instantaneous equilibria. At the time when expectations are formed, 
a shift from a virtuous to a vicious equilibrium increases the probability of 
abandoning the parity and, via the increase in the interest rate, leads to a 
contemporaneous contraction of money demand. However, even if the drop 
in demand drives down foreign exchange reserves, the speculative attack per 
se does not play any role in the exchange rate crisis. As a matter of facts, 
an interest sensitive demand for money is not even a necessary feature of 
models following the endogenous policy approach (see Obstfeld [1995] and 
Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996] among others). The differences with the 
Krugman-style model of section 3 are apparent. There, for a crisis to occur, 
money demand has to be interest-sensitive; moreover, both an exogenous 
process driving domestic credit and a lower bound on reserves are necessary 
elements in the analysis. 
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to conclude that :financial shocks 
and international reserves can only play a role in Krugman-style models of 
exchange rate crises. For instance, a more general specification of the public 
sector in Section 4 could stress the social welfare implications of acquiring 
reserves, by assuming (realistically) that reserves can be borrowed in the 
international markets at an increasing marginal cost (as in Buiter [1987]). 
In this case, costs and benefits of defending the peg would also depend on 
the opportunity costs of intervening in the foreign exchange market, with the 
stock of international reserves playing an important role in the dynamics of 
the crisis. 
The analysis in this paper has stressed the fact that multiple instanta-
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neous equilibria are not a specific feature of a particular modelling style. We 
have discussed a common kind of multiplicity that arise in the expectations 
game between the private and the public sectors when the exchange rate pol­
icy is not perfectly credible. While we have focused on nominal wage rigidity, 
Obstfeld [1994] provides an example based on nominal interest rates. 
In conclusion, there is a question of whether different modelling styles 
apply to different kinds of currency crises or, rather, they tell the same story 
from a different vantage point. Although a definite answer to this question 
may not exist, we find more useful to think of them as complementing each 
other in offering a theoretical perspective on exchange rate crises. We also be­
lieve that the modelling patterns discussed in this paper provide an insightful 
and efficient classification scheme of the literature so far developed. 
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Appendix I 
This appendix discusses the determination of the equilibrium nominal 
wage in the Krugman-style model. Substituting (19) in the semi-reduced 
form of the exchange rate conditional on the occurrence of a speculative 
attack (15), the equilibrium nominal wage must satisfy 
(1 - 7rt) (1 + 8 + a<f>)et + 
Wt = 
1 + 8 + (1 - 11"t)a</> 
7l"t [ ~ (1 + 8) mR]
1 + 0 + (l _ 11"t)a</> Et-dVt IL).et 2 0) + 1 + 0 _ 118 
For a given money supply, the computation of the equilibrium nominal wage 
requires the identification of a threshold value of the shock Vt such that, for 
any realization of the shock larger than this threshold, the private sector will 
launch a speculative attack leading to a currency depreciation. The threshold 
value Vt can be computed by including the above expression in the switching 
rule (16). We obtain 
_ mf a</> 1l"tEt-1(vt IVt 2th) 
-et + 1 + 8 - 7JO + 1 + 8 + a<f> 1 +8 + 
1 [ (1 - 7rt)a¢] > 
l+o+a</> l+ l+o Vt_O 
A solution for Vt is derived by evaluating this expression with the equality 
sign. In general, the resulting equation will be non linear. For example, as­
sume that Vt is uniformly distributed between-µ andµ. Then, our equation 
becomes quadratic in Vt 
0[-e. + 1+:~~· + 1+;~ a¢, 4{1: •il= 
Provided that the current parity has at least some credibility, the interior 




This appendix describes the determination of the equilibrium nominal 
wage in the model of Section 4. In the endogenous policy approach, ex­
pectations of the exchange rate are determined considering the two possible 
monetary regimes, m[ and m{l. Using (2) and (25), and restricting the sup­
port of the shock as to rule out equilibrium re-valuation, equilibrium nominal 
wages can be expressed as follows 
With rational expectations, nominal wages must be consistent with the policy 
makers' switching rule; we thus substitute the above expression in (26) as to 
obtain 
As in Appendix I, it is possible to characterize the equilibrium condition 
in terms of a threshold value of the real shock, Ut, such that the policy 
makers will optimally devalue for any realization of the shock larger than 
this threshold. The equilibrium value of Ut can be computed by finding the 
roots of the inequality just specified. In general, we will have to solve a non­
linear equation, so that, if an interior solution exists, the equilibrium value of 
Ut will not be unique. For example when Ut is uniformly distributed between 
-µ and µ, we solve the following quadratic equation 
1.o:2 +0 o:2 +0 + Ceo.a + ceo:fl.. 
2 -2 + t µ, t µ, _ + 
2µ Ut 2 Ut 
3
[y (a' +o) + 
l 
¼a'µ+C: (3;0 + ~ + ~)] = O 
Note that there cannot be multiple equilibria if the devaluation cost is either 
too low (so that the parity is not credible at all) or very high (so that the 
exchange rate regime is perfectly credible). Multiple equilibria only arise if 
the credibility of the exchange rate regime imperfect. 
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